Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

2013

Themistius and the Development of Averroes’ Noetics
Richard C. Taylor
Marquette University, richard.taylor@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/phil_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Taylor, Richard C., "Themistius and the Development of Averroes’ Noetics" (2013). Philosophy Faculty
Research and Publications. 346.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/phil_fac/346

THEMISTIUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AVERROES' NOETICS
Richard TAYLOR
(Marquette University)

Ibn Rushd or A verroes was famously known in the Middle Ages of
the Latin West as "the Commentator" for the most part due to the Latin
translations of four of his five Long Commentaries on works by Aristotle.
These four were the Long Commentaries on the De Anima, the Physics,
the De Caelo, and the Metaphysics. His Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics was translated into Latin in Renaissance times from
Hebrew .1 Each of these works contained a full text of Aristotle's work
1
De Anima : Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima
Libros, Crawford, F. S., ed. Cambridge, MA, 1953. Hereafter Long Commentary 1953.
My translation of this work, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the
De Anima of Aristotle, Taylor R.C., tr. & int., with Druart Th.-A. as subed., New Haven,
CT, 2009, will be cited as Long Commentary tr. (2009). Arabic fragments of what seems
to be an early version of the Long Commentary on the De Anima have been published by
Ben Chehida, A., in " Ik:tishaf al-n~~ al-carabi li-ahamm ajza' al-Shar~ al-kabir li-Kitab
al-nafs ta'lif Abi al-Walid ibn Rushd" Al-lfayiit al-Thaqiifiyya (35) 1985, pp. 14-48 ; and
also in part in a new edition in L'original arabe du Grand Commentaire d 'Averroes au De
anima d'Aristote. Premices d 'edition, Sirat, C., and Geoffroy, M., eds., Paris, 2005. The
available Arabic fragments are reproduced in the notes to my translation. Another volume
by Sirat and Geoffroy with the remainder of the fragments is forthcoming. Physics: The
Latin Long Commentary on the Physics in the translation attributed to Michael Scot is
found in the 1962 reprint of Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis. Venetiis
Apud Junctas, 1562-1574. v. 4. Reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1962. On this and the possibility of another translation by Herman the German, see Schmieja, H ., "Secundam
aliam translationem - Ein Beitrag zur arabisch-lateinischen Ubersetzung des GroBen
Physikkommentars von Averroes" in Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition . Sources,
Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd ( 1126-1198). Proceedings of
the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996), Endress, G., and Aertsen, J. A ., eds.,
Leiden, 1999, pp. 316-336. Schmieja is presently working on the edition of the Long
Commentary on the Physics by Averroes. He has published recently Averrois opera.
Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis physicorum librum septimum (Vindobonensis
lat. 2334) Schmieja H., ed., Paderbom, 2007. The original Arabic is not extant. Ruth
Glasner has published a study of the Hebrew and Latin texts of Averroes ' Physics commentaries and the development of his teachings on the principles of natural philosophy
in Glasner R., Averroes' Physics: A Turning Point in medieval natural Philosophy,
Oxford 2009. D e Caelo : Averrois Cordubensis commentum magnum super libro De celo
et mundo Aristotelis, Carmody, F. J., and Arnzen, R., eds., Leuven, 2003. While an edition
of the Arabic recently appeared (Shar!J al-Samii' wa-a[-<alam lil-Jfakim Aris{u{iilis, Abu
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accompanied by Averroes' s close, detailed, and oftentimes very expansive
commentary based on sources from the Greek and Arabic philosophical
traditions and his own philosophical acumen. While writings by Averroes
were known in the Arabic tradition, they did not give rise to a philosophical school or tradition in the Islamic world. 2 Yet it is no understatement _to say that his influence through these works and some others was
wide and deep among European thinkers of the Middle Ages and later,
conveying a powerful and threatening philosophical rationalism.3 Working
al-Walfd ibn Rushd, A. Jum<ah, A., ed., Tunis, 2002), the critical edition of Endress is still
in process. In 1994 Endress published Commentary on Aristotle's Book on the Heaven and
the Universe, by Ibn Rushd, facsimile of the unique Tunis manuscript, prepared by Gerhard Endress. Frankfurt am Main, 1994. Metaphysics: The Arabic is available in Averroes
Tafsir md ba<d a[-[abi<at in 4 v., Bouyges, M., ed., Beirut, 1938-1952. The Latin translation is being edited by Dag Nik:olas Hasse but this text (as well as most of his works
translated into Latin) is at present most easily available in the reprint of the Giunta Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XJIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et
epitome in Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis. Venetiis Apud Junctas, 15621574, v. 8. Reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1962. An English translation of book Liim I
Lambda is found in Genequand, Ch., Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,
Book Liim (Islamic Philosophy and Theology. Texts and Studies 1), Leiden, 1984. There is
also an incomplete French translation of this book: Averroes. Grand Commentaire de Ia
Metaphysique d'Aristote (fafsir rna baed at-tabi"at). Livre lam-lambda, Martin, A., tr.
(Bibliotheque de Ia Faculte de Philosophie et de Lettres de l'Universite de Liege, fasc.
234), Paris, 1984. Some translations of other parts of this work have been published in
Bauloye, L., "Averroes. Grand commentaire de Ia Metaphysique d'Aristote, Z1 et Z2.
Introduction, traduction et commentaire" in Bulletin d'etudes orientales de l'Institut Franfais de Damas (49) 1997, pp. 53-73; and Averroes. Grand commentaire (Tafsir) de Ia
Metaphysique. Livre Beta. Precede de "Averroes et les apories de Ia Metaphysique
d'Aristote" , Paris, 2002. There is also a French translation of book Ziiy (Uta): Etude du
livre Ziiy (Dzeta) de Ia "Metaphysique" d'Aristote dans sa version arabe et son commentaire par Averroes, EJsakhawi, A., tr., Villeneuve d'Ascq, France, 2001. Posterior
Analytics: The Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, partially extant in Arabic,
was translated during the Renaissance from Hebrew into Latin in two complete versions
by Abram de Balmes and Jo. Francisco Burana and one incomplete version by Jacob
Mantino. Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis. Venetiis Apud Junctas, 15621574, v. 1 pt. 2a. Reprint Minerva: Frankfurt am Main, 1962. For the extant Arabic, see
Ibn Rushd. Shar}J. al-Burhdn /i-Aris[u wa-Talkhi~ al-Burhdn (Ibn Rushd. Grand Commentaire et Paraphrase des Seconds Analytiques d'Aristote), ed., Badawi, <A., Kuwayt, 1984.
The most valuable bibliography of available primary and secondary literature is that of
David Wirmer et al. at the Thomas Institut in Cologne, an ongoing work with periodic
updates. See http://www.dare.uni-koeln.de
2
For an account of his friends, followers and students, see Puig Montada, J., "Materials
on Averroes's Circle", in Journal of Near Eastern Studies (51) 1992, pp. 241-260. Also
see his "El pensamiento de Averroes en su contexto personal y social" in Misceltinea de
estudios arabes y hebraicos (38) 1989-1990, pp. 307-324; and "Averroes, vida, ambiente
y persecucion de un fLiosofo" in Revista espanola defilosofla medieval (6) 1999, pp. 217232.
3 For an overview of the thought of Averroes, see Taylor, R. C., "Averroes: Religious
Dialectic and Aristotelian Philosophical Thought," in The Cambridge Companion to
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with the texts of an Aristotle who had been reshaped by .Greek Neoplatonic thinkers and the Arabic tradition, Averroes set out a philosophical
monotheism which was claimed, used, and attacked in varying ways and
degrees. Yet, however important and penetrating the rationalism of Averroes in his translated works may have been, it was not universally accepted
even if it was always a player in discussions of psychology, cosmology,
natural philosophy, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. The thinkers
of Medieval Christian Europe were shocked by his views (shared with
Aristotle) that the world is eternal, that the motion of this world is caused
by the Divine as final cause, not as creative efficient cause and not as a
matter of divine will, and that human happiness could in principle be
attained in the present life. Nevertheless, the most controversial doctrine
for Medieval Christian Europeans was the account of human intellect
in the Long Commentary on the De Anima, the infamous account which
held that human intellectual understanding takes place only by means of
two unique transcendent entities called Agent Intellect and Material Intellect and shared by all human beings.
The notion that all human intellectual understanding comes about in some
way by means of a single transcendent Agent Intellect was inherited by the
Arabic tradition from Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and others
of the Greek tradition.4 This notion is present in some form in al-KincfiS
and was fully adopted by the lOth century Baghdad philosopher al-Hirabi,6
Arabic Philosophy, Adamson, P., and Taylor, R. C., eds., Cambridge, 2005, pp. 180-200.
Hereafter CCAP.
4
On the Greek tradition, see Blumenthal, H. J., Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late
Antiquity: interpretations of the De Anima, London, 1996; and the collection of texts translated in the section on "Thought" in Sorabji, R., The Philosophy of the Commentators 200600 AD. A Sourcebook. Volume 1. Psychology, London, 2004.
5
For a discussion of al-Kindi's treatise, On the Intellect, see Adamson, P ., Al-Kindi,
Oxford, 2007, pp. 118-127.
6
Regarding al-Farabi, see Taylor, R. C., "Abstraction in al-Farabi" in Proceedings
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (80) 2006, pp. 151-168. For a particularly interesting and challenging account of al-F"arabi, see Vallat, Ph., Farabi et /'Ecole
d'Ale.xandrie. Des premisses de Ia connaissance a Ia philosophie po/itique, Paris, 2004.
Vallat's commissioned contribution on al-Fii.rabi to the current CNRS Project, "Noetique
et tbeorie de la connaissance dans la philosophie arabe des rx• -XVIT• siecles" directed
by M. Sebti and D. De Smet in Paris, will likely be an important contribution to the
study of al-Farabi on intellect. M. Geoffroy argues that al-Fii.rabi likely did not work
directly from the De Anima of Aristotle in "La tradition arabe du Ilepi vou d' Alexandre
d' Aphrodise et les origines de la tbeorie farabienne des quatre degres de !'intellect" in
Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba, D' Ancona, C., and Serra, G.,
eds., (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina 3}, Padova, 2002, pp. 191-231. For the understanding of al-F"arabi by Averroes, see Taylor, R. C., "The Agent Intellect as 'form for us' and
Averroes' Critique of al-F"arabi" in Topicos (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City) (29)
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by the Persian Ibn Sina or Avicenna,7 by the Andalusian Ibn Bajjah
or A vempace, 8 and by A verro~s himself, though each of these thinkers
conceived the nature and function of the Agent Intellect differently in
their epistemologies. 9 What is more, each at some time subscribed to the
notion t~at every human being possesses an individual human material
or receptive intellect which in some fashion receives intelligibles thanks
to the Agent Intellect. This includes A verroes who held this view in both
his early Short Commentary on the De Anima 10 and also in his later
2005, pp. 29-51, reprinted with corrections in Proceedings of the Society for Medieval
Logic and Metaphysics (5) 2005, pp. 18-32.
7
The traditional emanationist view of Avicenna well represented by Davidson, H.,
Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, Oxford, 1992, is criticized in Gutas, D.,
"Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure of Avicenna's Epistemology" in Aspects
of Avicenna, Princeton, 2001 (reprinted from Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. IX), Wisnovsky, R., ed., pp. 1-38; and in Hasse, D. N.,
"Avicenna on Abstraction", ibid., pp. 39-72. An analysis taking into account both views
is provided in McGinnis, J., "Making Abstraction Less Abstract: The Logical, Psychological and Metaphysical Dimensions of Avicenna's Theory of Abstraction" in Proceedings
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (80) 2006, pp. 169-183. For a valuable short account of epistemological issues in the Arabic tradition, see Black, D. L.,
"Psychology: Soul and Intellect" in CCAP, pp. 308-326. It is likely that a more valuable
approach to Avicenna on this issue would involve a distinction between two movements
of the soul, (i) apprehension through an abstractive account founded on sense perception
as a preparation for (ii) the rational soul's conjoining with the intelligibles in act present
in the Agent Intellect. This would be in accord with Porphyrian and late Neoplatonic
accounts which retain forms of both a (purportedly) Aristotelian activity of abstraction
and a Platonic notion of recollection. Also see the concluding remarks in D'Ancona, C.,
in "Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna. How to Combine Aristotle's De Anima and the
Enneads" in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, Knuuttila, S., and Karkkainen, P., eds., pp. 45-71, Dordrecht: Springer, 2008. I intend to address
this issue in detail elsewhere.
8 See Pines, S ., "The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to al-Farabi,
Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides" in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature,
Twersky, I., ed., Cambridge, MA, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 82-109. Reprinted in Collected
Works of Shlomo Pines, v. 5, Harvey, W. Z., and Idel, M., eds., pp. 404-431. Jerusalem : Magnes Press, 1997. See Altmann, A., "Ibn Bajja on Man's illtimate Felicity" in
Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, Jerusalem, 1965, v.1, pp. 47-87. Also see Puig
Montada, J., "Philosophy in Andalusia: Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl" in CCAP, pp. 155-179,
in particular pp. 161-164; and "Ibn Bajja" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E. N., ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-Bajja/. (First published
Fri 28 Sep, 2007).
9 See Davidson (1992) for a comprehensive account. For a short account, see Black in
CCAP, pp. 317-322.
10 Talkhi~ Kitiib al-Nafs, El-Ahwani, A. F., ed., Cairo, 1950. Hereafter Short Commentary (1950). Although the editor gives it the title Talkhi~ which denotes a Middle
Commentary, this is Averroes's Short Commentary on the De Anima. This edition contains the original version with Averroes' summary of Ibn Bajjah's Risiilat ltti~iil al-caql
bi-l-insiin (Treatise on the Conjoining of the Intellect with Man) omitted in Epitome
de Anima, G6mez Nogales, S., ed., Madrid, 1985. Hereafter Short Commentary (1985).
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Middle Commentary on the De Anima, 11 both arguably completed prior
to the composition of the late fmal version of his Long Commentary. 12 In
these two earlier works each human being has a personal material intellect receptive of intelligibles by virtue of which that human being is
deemed rational. In the Short Commentary, the material intellect is said
to be a disposition of the intelligible forms of the imagination. 13 In the
This latter edition, which contains the later version of the Short Commentary with
Averroes' revisions and reference to his Long Commentary on the De Anima, is translated in La Psicologfa de Averroes. Comentario a/ libro sobre e/ alma de Arist6teles,
G6mez Nogales, S., tr., Madrid, 1987. Hereafter Short Commentary (1987). This translation renders texts excised late by Averroes but found in Short Commentary (1950) though
not printed in Short Commentary (1985). The Short Commentary on the De Anima is also
published in Rasii'il Ibn Rushd, Hyderabad, 1947. Regarding the problems of the editions
of the Short Commentary, see al-cAlawT, J., al-Matn al-Rushdi, Casablanca, 1986, p. 53,
n. 8, and his "The Philosophy of Ibn Rushd. The Evolution of the Problem of the Intellect
in the Works of Ibn Rushd : From Philological Examination to Philosophical Analysis"
in The Legacy of Muslim Spain, Jayyusi, S. Kh., ed., Leiden-New York-Koln, 1992,
pp. 804-829, in particular, pp. 807-811. Selections from the translation of the Short
Commentary by G6mez Nogales are also published in Sobre el Intelecto. Abu-1-Wa/id
Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Lorca, A.M., ed. and tr., Madrid, 2004. For an overview of the
contents of the Short Commentary, see lvry, A. L., "Averroes' Short Commentary on
Aristotle's De anima" in Documenti e Studi sui/a Tradizione filosofica medievale (8)
1997, pp. 511-549.
11
For this text, seeAverroes. Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. A Critical
Edition of the Arabic Text with English Translation, Notes and Introduction, lvry, A. L.,
ed. and tr., Provo, Utah, 2002. Hereafter Middle Commentary (2002).
12
Dating the works of A verroes is very difficult business in part because in many
cases he returned to earlier works to insert changes, corrections and remarks. Roughly
put, the Short Commentary on the De Anima was probably composed around 1158-1160,
the Middle Commentary perhaps around 1174-1180, and the Long Commentary completed likely around 1186. Comments by Averroes in the Hebrew version of his Long
Commentary on the Physics found by Ruth Glasner indicate that the Long Commentary
on the De Anima was the frrst of the Long Commentaries completed. See Glasner, R.,
Review of Averroes. Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. A Critical Edition of
the Arabic Text with English Translation, Notes and Introduction, Alfred L. lvry, in Aestimatio (1) 2004, pp. 57-61, in particular pp. 58-59. Evidence presently available seems to
indicate the likelihood that Averroes drew upon an early version of the Long Commentary
for a number of texts of his Middle Commentary. Identical texts in these two works are
identified at Long Commentary tr. (2009) introduction, n. 41, pp. XXIX-XXX. Sirat and
Geoffroy in their work cited in note 1 argue for several early versions of the Long Commentary or parts of it.
13 In his Treatise on the Conjoining of the Intellect with Man, Ibn Biijjah writes that,
in the case of the intelligibles in the material intellect, that which is understood is not at
all material nor spiritual but rather "it is a form having as its matter the intermediate
spiritual forms of the imagination (~_,:...!14~1i_,;l>.JJI.;..,...JI t.'i.r-1' iJY c..s"). " Ibn Biijjah,
Risiilat Itti~iil a/-caql bi-1-insiin, Palacios, M. A., ed. and tr., in "Tratado de Avempace
sobre Ia Union del Intelecto con el Hombre", al-Andalus (7) 1942, pp. 1-47 : see Arabic,
p. 13, Spanish, p. 30; Rasii'il Ibn Biijjah al-Iliihiyah (Ibn Biijjah (Avempace). Opera
Metaphysica), Fakhry, M., ed., Beirut, 1968, pp. 153-173, seep. 160; French translation
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Middle Commentary he rejected that as tying this necessarily immaterial
receptive power too closely to the body or a power of body. Instead, in
the Middle Commentary Averroes made the material intellect a disposition receptive of intelligibles by conceiving it as a disposition of the soul,
as it were, standing off immaterially at a distance from composition with
the body~ 14 In both of these works the material intellect is a disposition
belonging to a human individual - not something shared - and the individuation and the existence of the material intellect is dependent upon
the human soul. Although Averroes does not raise the issue of individual
immortality in these early works, the material intellect's complete
dependence on the bodily human soul for individuation implies that this
personal human intellect perishes with the death of the body of which the
soul is the actuality. In the Long Commentary Averroes also has no room
for individual personal immortality for particular human beings, though
by Lagardere, V., in "L'Epitre d'lbn Bajja sur la conjonction de }'intellect avec }'esprit
humain" Revue des Etudes Islamiques (49) 1981, pp. 175-196, seep. 185. Averroes
follows Ibn Bajjah in the Short Commentary when he describes the material intellect
as "the disposition which is in the forms of the imagination for receiving the intelligibles" (J}~1 .,/~_r-+11 JW1r ..;..)'_,.;.......ll J_,.Al ~t,.;J1_;_,....ll ,j (jll1 .)1..t..:.... )11 0.)\.i). Short Commentary (1950), p. 86; (1985), p. 124; (1987), p. 209. i read J-.Al1 in Short Commentary
(1985) as a typographical error for JWI. Simply put, in his late doctrine Averroes held
for a single, shared transcendent material intellect, but he held for a plurality of individual
material intellects, one for each human knower, in the Short Commentary and in the
Middle Commentary.
14
"For, this faculty, which is called the material intellect, if it is to think all things
-that is, receive the forms of all things- cannot be mixed with any one form; that is, it
cannot be mixed with the subject in which it is found, as the other material faculties are.
(278) If the rational faculty were mixed with any form, then one of two things would have
to occur: either the form of the subject with which it was mixed would impede the forms
this faculty would receive, or it would change them - that is, it would change the form
being received. Were this so, the forms of things would not exist in the intellect as they
really are- that is, the forms existing in the intellect would be changed into forms different from the actual forms. If, therefore, the nature of the intellect is to receive the
forms of things which have retained their natures, it is necessary that it be a faculty
unmixed with any form whatsoever." Middle Commentary (2002), p. 109. "It has thus
been explained that the material intellect is something composed of the disposition found
in us and of an intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to the disposition, it
is a disposed intellect, not an intellect in act; though, as not conjoined to this disposition,
it is an intellect in act; while, in itself, this intellect is the Agent Intellect, the existence of
which will be shown later. As conjoined to this disposition, it is necessarily an intellect in
potentiality which cannot think itself but which can think other than itself (that is, material things), while, as not conjoined to the disposition, it is necessarily an intellect in act
which thinks itself and not that which is here (that is, it does not think material things)."
Ibid., pp. 111-112. Also see the text cited at note 53 below. Here and throughout this
paper I modify Ivry's translation by using the term 'material intellect' for J\'_r-+)1 JW1 in
lieu of his 'hylic intellect.'
·
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the ontologies of intelligibles in act and immaterially separate material
intellect are completely different from what is found in the other two
commentaries. 15
In preparing all three of his commentaries on the De Anima, A verroes
had at hand the Paraphrase of the De Anima by the late Greek commentator Themistius. 16 1n his analyses in the Short and Middle Commentaries
on the De Anima A verroes made use of this work sometimes directly
15
See Taylor, R. C., "Personal Immortality in Averroes' Mature Philosophical Psychology" in Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale (9) 1998, pp. 87110; and "Intelligibles in act in Averroes" in Averroes et les averroi:Smes juif et latin.
Actes du colloque tenu a Paris, 16-18 juin 2005, Brenet, J.-B., ed., Turnhout, 2007,
pp. 111-140.
16 Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, Heinze, R., ed., Berlin,
G. Reirneri, 1899, [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 5.3]. An Arabic Translation of
Themistius' Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Lyons, M. C., ed., Columbia, South
Carolina, and Oxford, England, 1973. This Arabic text, based on an incomplete manuscript, is missing Greek pp. 2-22 and some other passages. Themistius, On Aristotle's On
the Soul, Todd, R. B., tr., Ithaca, N.Y., 1996. Todd also translated selections from the
Greek text in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, Schroeder, F. M.,
and Todd, R. B., tr., Toronto, 1990. Themistius is argued to have been influenced by
Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism in his Paraphrase of the De Anima in Verbeke, G.,
"Themistius et le 'De unitate intellectus' deS. Thomas" in Thernistius, Commentaire sur
le Traite de /'arne d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Edition critique et
etude sur /'utilisation du commentaire dans l'ceuvre de saint Thomas, Verbeke, G., ed.,
Leiden, 1973, pp. XL ff; Balleriaux, 0., "Themistius et l'exegese de la noetique aristotelicienne" in Revue de philosophie ancienne (7) 1989, pp. 199-233; Falcon, A. "Commentators on Aristotle" in The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (Winter 2005 Edition),
Zalta, E. N., ed., URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/aristotlecommentators/>; and seemingly de Libera, A., in his L 'Unite de /'intellect de Thomas
d'Aquin. Commentaire du De unitate intellectus contra averroistas de Thomas d'Aquin,
Paris, 2004, pp. 490 ff. A more thoroughly Aristotelian interpretation is set forth by
Blumenthal, H. J., in "Thernistius, the Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?", in
Arktouros. Hellenic Studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the occasion of his
65th birthday, Bowersock, G. W., Burkert, W., and Putnam, M. C. J., eds., Berlin and New
York, 1979, pp. 391-400. In a revised version of this article published with the same title
in Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, Sorabji, R., ed.
and tr., Ithaca, N.Y., 1990, Blumenthal adds discussion of E. P. Mahoney on the purported Neoplatonism of Themistius. There Blumenthal concludes that "such Neoplatonic
influence as there may have been was marginal in matters of doctrine, and only a little
greater in features of language." p. 121. Cf. Mahoney, E. P., "Thernistius and the agent
intellect in James of Viterbo and other thirteenth-century philosophers" in Augustiniana
(23) 1973, pp. 423-67; and "Neoplatonism, the Greek Commentators, and Renaissance
Aristotelianism" in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Studies in Neoplatonism:
Ancient and Modern 3), O'Meara, D. J., ed., Albany NY, 1982, pp. 169-77 and pp. 26482. For other related articles by Mahoney, see Blumenthal1990, n. 25. I am now inclined
to fmd some influence from the Platonic tradition in the assertion by Thernistius that the
forms are precontained in the transcendent Productive I Agent Intellect, though on the
whole his account seems significantly more Aristotelian than Platonic. See Themistius,
Greek (1899), p. 103.30-32 cited with the Arabic below at note 45.
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citing Themistius and at other times drawing inspiration without citation.
Careful examination of the three Commentaries on the De Anima gives
clear evidence that A verroes ·made three distinct studies of the Paraphrase by Themistius in preparing the Commentaries. 11 In the Long Commentary on the De Anima, however, it is clear that he worked much more
closely_with the text of Themistius than ever before and that he was fully
engaged with it in a critical fashion. And it is that critical engagement
with the Paraphrase on the De Anima by Themistius which played the
key role in Averroes' s development of his new doctrine of the unique,
separate yet shared Material Intellect in the Long Commentary on the De
Anima, a doctrine which caused great and recurring controversy in Latin
Europe. 18
In what follows here I locate and expound two key epistemological
principles which Averroes encountered in his late reading of the Paraphase of the De Anima by Themistius and which he adapted idyosyncratically as essential features in his own so-called 'Aristotelian' account
of the nature of human intellectual understanding. However, despite their
appearance in the context of the arguments of A verroes, at least one and
perhaps both of these principles might be understood as not properly
Aristotelian but rather what we might call central doctrines of the Platonic
tradition: (1) the unity of known intelligibles in a single transcendent
encompassing thesaurus, the Material Intellect, and (2) the formal, intrinsic
participation by all human knowers in a single transcendent entity, the

17

This is discussed in Long Commentary tr. (2009), introduction, pp. XXIX-XXX.
No adequate comprehensive overview of Averroism is available today. Cruz Hernandez, M., Abii-1-Walid MuiJ.ammad Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Vida, Obra, Pensamiento, /nfluencia 2nd ed., C6rdoba, 1997, provides some brief essays on Averroism. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/ has several valuable contributions
on the influence of Averroes on the Hebrew tradition by M. Zonta, S. Pessin and J. T. Robinson. Also see Harvey, S., "Philosophy in southern France: Controversy over philosophical study and the influence of Averroes upon Jewish thought" in the Cambridge
Companion to Jewish Philosophy, Frank, D. H., and Leaman, 0. eds., Cambridge, 2003,
pp. 281-303, and his chapter "Islamic philosophy and Jewish philosophy" in CCAP,
pp. 349-369, are valuable overviews. Many individual studies of the work of Siger of
Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and other thinkers considered by some to be Latin Averroists have been published but new conceptual work remains to be done on precisely
what constitutes Latin Averroism in its possibly many forms and influences. Individual
studies are far too numerous to detail here so I just mention a few: A verroes et les averroi'smes juif et latin. Actes du colloque tenu a Paris, 16-18 juin 2005 (cited in nt. 15);
Brenet, J.-B., Transferts du sujet. La noetique d'Averroes selon Jean de Jandun, Paris,
2003; and A verroes and the Aristotelian Tradition cited in nt. t, are just three recent
contributions. For more studies, see the valuable online bibliography of Averroes and
Averroism by David Winner cited in nt. 1.
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Agent Intellect. I conclude with consideration of whether these principles in the thought of A verroes on intellect are indeed suitably called
Platonic or might better be called principles of an Aristotelian form of
participation.

1. Intellect in Averroes' Short and Middle Commentaries on the De
Anima: One Transcendent Shared Agent Intellect and a Plurality
of Individual Human Material Intellects

1.1. The Short Commentary on the De Anima
A verroes' first substantial account on the nature of the intellect
in human beings is found in his Short Commentary on the De Anima,
also known as his Epitome (mukhta~ar). Although relevant remarks are
found in other sections of that work, it is in chapter 8 on the theoretical
or rational power (al-na~arl) and in various remarks in earlier chapters
that A verroes addresses the understanding that theoretical intelligibles
(al-macquliit al-na?arfyah) must be both separate intelligibles in act- in
some fashion - and also received in individual human knowers. This
knowing reception of intelligibles on the part of human beings is their
realization or perfection of the ultimate human disposition (cala isticdadihi al-akhiri) for the apprehension of intelligibles in act. 19
Intelligibles come to exist in the soul by way of the impressions (iithiir)
of sensibles which move or affect the external senses, which then move
the common sense, which in turn moves the power of imagination.20
These impressions in the case of each of the subjects into which they are
received are to be regarded as the perfection and act of the power into
which they are received, which is also the case for the forms which exist
by discursive thought and discovery21 received by way of experience of
the world into the external and internal senses as intentions (maciinin).
The reception into the senses and internal powers at each step becomes
more and more spiritual or less and less material. However, while imagination is common to all animals,22 the nature of this power of imagination

19

Short Commentary (1950), pp. 72-73; (1985), pp. 106-107; (1987), pp. 195-

196.
20
21

Short Commentary (1950), pp. 63-64; (1985), pp. 87-88; (1987), pp. 177-178.
Short Commentary (1950), p. 71.5 ff.; (1985), p. 102.5 ff. ; (1987), pp. 189-

190.
22

Short Commentary (1950), pp. 64-65; (1985), pp. 88-89; (1987), pp. 178-179.
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in human beings transcends what it is in other animals since it in some
way functions as the subject for the universal and as receptive of intelligibles.23 In this case, when mtentions are received into the imagination
no contrary must be displaced since "The imaginative soul is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an organic instrument for its
activity. " 24 Though now perfected or completed at a higher more spiritual
and less material level, these images are still conceived as individual
and material25 and in the individual's imagination are individuated by
the subjects into which they are received as "multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects and numbered by their enumeration. " 26 Hence,
while these imagined intentiones garnered from the world give rise to
intelligibles and are the grounds and causes for the truth (~adiq) of the
intelligibles in act coming about in the mind,27 they are nevertheless still
at the level of particularity and materiality and so cannot yet be properly
considered the intelligibles in act which function in the mind as universals. Indicating that conceiving by imagination differs from intellectual
conception, Averroes writes earlier that, "Intellectual conceptualization
is the freeing of the universal intention from matter, not insofar as it has
an individual and material relation in its substance. Rather, if that [latter]
were necessarily so, then this would entail that this is one of the properties of the universal, that is, it would be numbered by the number of
individuals and it would have to have a material relation. " 28 Hence, since
the apprehension of intentions is either as particular or universai29 with
particular apprehension taking place in a material subject and with universal or intellectual apprehension taking place only in a way completely
23

Short Commentary (1950), pp. 70-71; (1985), pp. 100-101 ; (1987), pp. 189-190.
Cf. Short Commentary (1950), p. 68; (1985), pp. 90-91; (1987), pp. 185- 186, where he
says it is not in the teleology of other animals to have other powers higher than sense and
imagination.
24
Short Commentary (1?50), p. 74.9-10; (1985), p. 108.14-15; (1987), p. 197: ~J

4\ ill JJ 4J..i ~ (. ~ '1 ~\ ~I u-CJI
25

Short Commentary (1950), p. 61.8; (1985), p. 84.11; (1987), pp. 174-175: ..:..')~.,>..:....)\

;.<:N.r-1'J ~ c./' ~ <Y ~,.J_,..a.:;
26

wJ

.

Short Commentary (1950), p. 80.13; (1985), p. 116.9; (1987), p. 203: fo o~ ~\

I.A .:>...l.A:i o.:..L.;...J ..:..~_,...,_,..J 1
27
Short Commentary (1950), p. 80; (1985), pp. 116-117; (1987), p. 203 .
28
Short Commentary (1950), p. 61.11-14; (1985), pp. 84.13-85.2 ; (1987), p. 175:
' o_/'y;- ~ 4'1,r.A ~ ~ .J ~ .y '1 ,J_r-+)1 .y ~\ ~\ ~_r.J J-+i J.WI J_,..dl L.iJ

.J

»:-.; dJ' '-""'6:....!.~1 .:.~ .)~ oi ~i , ~~ ~1_,1

:r ~'1 ..

!.lh

oi ~ ,~ 'lJ o\5' w! J

4'1,r.A 4-.i

Short Commentary (1950), p. 67.10-11; (1985), p. 94.4; (1987), p. 184: ~t.....ll
~ L.lJ JS' L.j :u\..4.:..,.:> ~J...WI. Note that (1950) misprints p . 67 asp. 71.
29
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free of matter, the understanding of the nature of the subject in which
intelligibles in act exist is of essential importance.
In human beings, there are activities of conceptualization and assent30
by which abstraction and judgment take place. What are apprehended in
some way in human knowing are forms insofar as these are intelligible,
universal, and free from matter. This abstraction, also described by the
phrase, "intellectual conceptualization" (at-ta~awwur bi-1-caq£),
is the freeing of the forms from matter. When the forms are freed from
matter individual multiplicity is eliminated from them. It is not necessary
that the elimination of individual material multiplicity be the elimination
of multiplicity altogether, for perhaps there can remain here a multiplicity
in a way, although in a way such that the forms are freed from determinate
multiplicity (min kathratin mal:z_dudatin) and are judged as an indeterminate
multiplicity (cala kathratin ghaira mutaniihiyatin). It may be found that this
act belongs to an immaterial power because, if it is necessary that the apprehension of separate forms be indeterminate, it is necessary that the apprehension of material forms have determinateness and the judgment of them
involve determinateness. If the judgment of material forms involves determinateness, then what is a judgment of indeterminateness? For it is necessarily immaterial since the judgment of the thing is an apprehension of it or
by way of the nature belonging to what apprehends it. From this it appears
-upon my life! -that this power in us is immaterial.. .. 31

Forms, however, are one insofar as they are intelligible, but multiplied
insofar as they are individual and material. 32 Now, since an intelligible
30

Short Commentary (1950), p. 6~.5-6; (1985), p. 95.3-4; (1987), p. 185: J}YI J-.All_,
<jWI_, , IJ_,.....; ~ o_,AJI o..Lo. ~UI ,:r
Short Commentary (1950), pp. 76.12-77.4; (1985), pp. 111.11-112.6; (1987), p. 199:

~...L..a.i
31

~ ~JI J_,..ll ,:r J_,...JI o..:.J;;_r.J l.>lJ .J_,..ll ,:r J_,...JI ~_r.; Y' wJ JW~ J_,...dl .:>i .!..lh_,
...W -..;~ .(~)")~..,pi ;,_;.S:.ll t w) 4il'_,..ll ~~ o_;.S:JI t w) if rfi ..,.-.J_, .~1 •fiJI
~ w::.:... ~J ;,;;_,..~.>v •? .:r J_,...JI ;;_r.; ~i ~ .:r .}J ' L. ~)'! •? !.1\.:.o. ~ d ~
!.IIJ;;! 0~ .:>i ~1_, .:>lS' .:>J -..;'...; .4l'y....,.;:. i_,AJ JMll l..i..- .:>~ .:>i ~ ...w ' ~b..,.;:. •?
.:>IS' l.>lJ .ob ~ ~-' , ol::...l 4l'_,..ll J_,...JI !.IIJ;;J u~ .:>i ~-' , ob fl"l ~Jl.WI J_,...JI
~I .:>IS' .>J , Jl'y.- _;:i:- iJJ? _,.; , ob _;:i:- ~ ~ Y' W ob ~ yl'_,..!1 J_,...JI ~
_;:i:- \.:..;~I o_,A)I -•.Lt. .:>i- ~.>.r-J- ~ I..Lo. ~ ..J ;SJ..i.,o ~ J,i ,:r _,i , .J !.IIJ;;J ~I~
.yl'Y-'
Note that I follow Short Commentary (1950) which has JW~ J_,....a:ll rather than J_,...dl
J-.Al~

found in Short Commentary (1985). The (1987) Spanish translation agrees with the
text of Short Commentary (1950).
32
Short Commentary (1950), p. 75.13-17; (1985), p. 110.7-11; (1987), p. 198 :

yl....A.:.ll J_,...JI )L.. ;;Y':'} Q:!Y ~ ~-.,; ~i .:>l....ii\1 ..;..,l'~l Jr' ;;y.-_,) ,:r ~ ...U -..;J J_,..<.a
~ ,:r o..~.>-1_, ~i .!..lb_,, J_,.t-ll \.o.;;y>;-J.;:i- ...,JJ)..!....ll ~r"'.J" d \.o..).J":'JJ_,...JI o..Lo. ..:,.;IS' .>J, .Y

Jy.. ~-' ~-..;- ~ .:r ;,p..:._._,' 4l_,.w ,j>
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is formed by abstraction from the content of experience,33 the intelligible
in act must be separate from ~atter and must also be unlimited insofar
as it is universal. For this apprehension and conceptualization of intelligibles to take place in act, there must be a receptive matter as subject
for intelligibles in act, the material intellect. This matter, however, is
only a disposition (isticdiid) which makes possible the abstraction of
intelligibles and as such must be only equivocally material: 34 it must be
in potency and receptive of the intelligibles in a way unlike the receptivity of matter. Further, this disposition must itself have a subject which
cannot be body because intelligibles are not material as are forms in
body; yet that subject cannot be intellect because it is something in
potency, not in act as is the case for intellect. Thus the subject for the
disposition equivocally called material intellect is the human soul and
among its powers nothing is more suitable as subject than the forms of
the imagination since the material intellect exists through their existence
and ceases with their ceasing. A verroes recounts these considerations
when he writes,
Since it has been made evident that these intelligibles are generated, it is
necessary that there be a disposition which precedes them. And since the
disposition is something which is not separate, it is necessary that it exist
in a subject. It is not possible for this subject to be a body according to
what has been made evident regarding these intelligibles not being material in the way in which bodily forms are material. It is also not possible
that it be an intellect, since it is something in potency, for there is not
anything in it in act of that for which it is a potency. Since this is so, then
the subject for this disposition must be a soul. And there is nothing evident here closer to being the subject of these intelligibles among the
powers of the soul than the forms of the imagination. Since it has been
"We say that it is perhaps evident from the issue of the existence of the forms of the
intelligibles belonging to human beings that they are in [human beings] in a way different
from the existence of the rest of the spiritual forms in [human beings], since the existence
of these forms in their determinate particular subject is different from their intelligible
existence. For they are one insofar as they are intelligible, but multiplied insofar as they
are particular and in matter. "
33
Sensation of individuals of a species is required for knowledge of a species.
Short Commentary (1950), p. 79.11- 12; (1985), p. 115.8-9 ; (1987), p. 202: .:.r- u~ ~i_,
.J~ o.J.:s. ~ L. ti ._,.,~i ~
Note that I follow (1950) ~~and not ( 1985)

.:f; rl·

rl

rl·

"Also, if one does not have sensation of individuals of a certain species, one does not
have the intelligible of it. "
34
Short Commentary ( 1950), p. 83.11-12; (1985), p. 120.13 ; (1987), p. 206: 4J ._r:l;

jy>:dl_, ~\ ~

JP 'l'! Jy..

" For it does not have matter except by analogy and metaphor."
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made evident that [the intelligibles] exist only as dependent on [the forms
of the imagination] and that [the intelligibles] exist with [the "forms of the
imagination] and perish with their perishing, then the disposition which is
in the forms of the imagination for receiving the intelligibles is the first
material intellect. 35

Furthermore, since the disposition that is called material intellect
and that exists in the forms of the imagination cannot be self-actuating
and since the intelligibles in it are not images but intelligibles as universal, not particular, it remains that an Agent Intellect which is per se
intellectual and intelligible in act must provide the intellectuality of
abstraction or conception. "For the material intellect, insofar as it is
material, needs necessarily for its existence that there be here an intellect existing eternally in act. " 36 And when this actuality of the Agent
Intellect37 is present to or " in" a human being for abstraction as what
35

Short Commentary (1950), p. 86.5-15; (1985), p. 124.1-10; (1987), p. 209:
\...... -ll..l.A::..... )II viS' WJ ly~ -ll..l.A::.....I oJJ.? .!JJ~ , 4bl>- ..::,..)'_,.u...ll o..i.a. vi ~ » ~~ -..;J
ui ,y .:.d L. ~ ,~ t_.,-Pyo-lll..i.a. v~ .:>i ~ ~J t_r".r tJ .J.:>:-y. .:>i r) ,JJI.A:!)'
.:>fo vi ~i ~ )'J 4'J.r." 4~1 J_,....JI '-/ lS.iJI ~)~ ,4'J~ ~ ..:..'J_,.u..JI o..i.a.
, .!.UK .!.ll~ viS' I~!J ~ l>} _,.,. \....... J-.Al~ L. c.,f ...; ~ , L. ~ •_,.a!~ y. L. .:JIS' ~! , ~
o-4J t__rPyo-ll v~ vi JJ yji c.,f L..U. ~ ~J ~ (y.) oJJ.? .li~'JI I-4J t__,.pyo-lU
!+iJ ,~ 4,6.,;/' .l.:>:-y wJ !+i ~»viS'~~ 4~1 J_,...JI l>y u-AJI l>} .:fl ,y .;,..)'_,.u..JI
j.AJI y> ..;...'J~I J_r.Al 4~1 J_,...JI ,_} lS.ill .ll..l.A::.....'JI v~U .ly~ r.;.,.;J d.A-ly.y. ~y
.J}~I d)'-'*I
Regarding a correction to the printed text of Short Commentary (1950) here, see
note 13 above.
36 Short Commentary (1950), p. 88.14-16; (1985), pp. 126.17-127.1; (1987), p. 212:
J-Al~ .ly.y ~ L..u. 0~ oi J! O.ly>:-J tJ ~J.? c~ ,d)'>:"__,.,.~ ,ti'J-'*1 J.AJI vi .!..lhJ
Wb. In his Short Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, Averroes seems to set forth a
similar doctrine. "If all the foregoing is ascertained, it cannot be denied that the separate
intelligence endows the imaginative soul with the universal nature (a{-(abFah al-kulllyah)
that the individual that comes into being possesses, that is to say, with a comprehension
of its causes, and the imaginative soul will receive it as a particular (juz'iyan) by virtue of
the fact that it is in matter. It may receive the individual (shakh~) of that which has been
comprehended, in reality, or it may receive something similar to it. Just as the intelligence
endows one with the universal perfections of the soul and matter receives them as particulars, so here too the intelligence endows the imaginative soul with the final perfection
as a universal, and the soul receives it as a particular." Averrois Cordubensis Compendia
Librorum Aristotelis Qui Parva Naturalia Vocantur, Shields, A.L., and Blumberg, H., eds.,
Cambridge, MA, 1949, p. 109-110; Averroes. Epitome of Parva Naturalia. Translated
from the Original Arabic arul the Hebrew arul Latin Versions, Blumberg. H., tr., Cambridge, MA, 1961, p. 46; Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd. Talkhi$ Kitiib al-lfiss wa-1-Ma}Jsus,
Blumberg, H. ed., Cambridge, MA, 1972, p. 79.7-12.
37
In the Short Commentary Averroes uses both ~\.All JWI or ~\.All and J~l j.WI to
denote the Agent or Active InteUect, as I indicated earlier. See Short Commentary (1950),
p. 75.18 and p. 88. 18; (1985) p. 123.13 and p. 127.4; (1987) p. 209 and p. 212.
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Averroes characterizes as "form for us", 38 there takes place the elevation
of intelligibles from particularity to universality. "This state is what is
known as uniting and conjoining", 39 writes Averroes. The intelligibles
garnered by the soul in this way must remain unmixed with the forms
of the imagination as transcendent, and yet must also be linked, adjacent,
and transcendent to their subject, the forms of the imagination,40 since
(as Aristotle says following Anaxagoras) intellect must remain unmixed
in order to know .4'
In the Short Commentary Averroes mentions Themistius eight times,
matched among the post Aristotelian thinkers only by Alexander whom
he also mentions eight times. The three passages of the chapter on the
rational faculty are particularly relevant to the doctrine of intellect and
intelligibles and brief consideration of each will prove valuable for comparison to his use of Themistius in other works.
The first mention of Themistius in the chapter on the rational faculty
occurs in the context of a discussion of the nature of the existence of universals and their foundation in experience.42 There Averroes is concerned
38

Short Commentary (1950), p. 89.3-6; (1985), p. 127.7-10; (1987), p. 212:

J) J_,.w •JJ? u J.-- ..u u~J ,u •J.J-P .Y' ~ .:r c.?i ,•A u .:?--- ~ ui ~ .!..ll.ilJ

::._.':I_,A-.]1 ~ JW\5' LW .:r ~ o:.y.J ui ':1, .J.i..u ~) ~ oi..J..i&. ~I_,...~

i....-A.i

~ ulS' .)j

.4':/_,..JI
"For this reason it is clear that its intellect can belong to us ultimately. I mean insofar
as it is form for us and it is such that it has generated for us as necessary an eternal intelligible. Since it is itself an intellect whether or not we have intellectual understanding of
it, it is not the case that its existence as intellect is from our activity as is the case in
regard to material intelligibles." Regarding this notion of the Agent InteJiect as "form
for us", see Geoffroy, M., "Averroes sur !'intellect comme cause agente et cause formelle
et la question de la 'jonction"' in Averroes et les averroismes juif etlatin. Actes du coltoque tenu a Paris, 16-18 juin 2005 (cited in note 15), pp. 77-110. Also see Taylor, R. C.,
"The Agent Intellect as 'form for us ' and Averroes's critique of al-Flirabi" cited in note
6 and "Intelligibles in act in Averroes" cited in nt. 15.
39
Short Commentary (1950), p. 89.6-7; (1985), p. 127.10-11; (1987), p. 213: o.iAJ
JL,a;':IIJ :.l>.J':I~ J _rU ~\ ..I" JWI
40
Geoffroy notes 'thaf cosmology provided Averroes with models to explain the relationship between corporeal powers such as imagination or cogitation and the immaterial
power of intellect. See Averroes. La Beatitude de l'ame. Editions, traductions et etudes,
Geoffroy, G., and Steel, C., eds. and tr., Paris, 2001, pp. 71 ff. Geoffroy and Steel point out
that Averroes seems to have in mind this cosmological model to explain the transcendence
of the material intellect in his Against the Avicennians on the First Cause (1997) composed
in the same period. See Averroes. La Beatitude de l'ame (2001), pp. 71-73. Averroes has
also a cosmological model in mind in the Short Commentary. See (1985) section 124,
p. 122,line 10.
41
Short Commentary (1950), p. 87; (1985), p. 125; (1987), p. 210.
42
Short Commentary (1950), p. 81; (1985), pp. 117-118; (1987), p. 204.
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with the issue of the subject of intelligibles and asserts that on the
account of Plato the universals do not have need of a subject if they exist
in act external to the soul. 43 Averroes rejects this and holds instead that
they do not exist outside the soul except insofar as they are in individuals of the world, mentioning Aristotle's account in the Metaphysics.
Rather, the basis for the universals is found in the images of corresponding individuals (khayiiliit ashkhii$i-hii) so that the universals come to be
multiplied with the multiplication of individuals, in such a way that the
intelligible belonging to one person is not the same as the intelligible
belonging to another. In this way, writes Averroes, the universals are
based on the images belonging individually to each human being, such
that the connection between the intelligibles and the forms of the imagination is essential to human understanding. To this extent, then, the
apprehension of universals in the soul depends upon their subject, the
forms in the imagination belonging to individuals. For this reason, Averroes rejects the confusion of Themistius and others who hold that the
forms exist eternally in act external to the soul.
For this Platonic understanding of the doctrine of Themistius in the
Arabic translation of the Paraphrase of the De Anima, A verroes appears
to read Themistius to assert both that there is one transcendent Agent
Intellect and that there is one set of transcendent forms in the Agent Intellect. These are clearly implied where Averroes reads the following in the
Arabic version of Themistius.
There need be no wonder that we all are as a group composites of what is
in potency and of what is in act. All of us whose existence is by virtue of
this one are referred back to a one which is the Agent Intellect. For if not
this, then whence is it that we possess known sciences in a shared way?
And whence is it that the understanding of the primary definitions and primary propositions is alike [for us all] without learning? For it is right that,
if we do not have one intellect in which we all share, then we also do not
have understanding of one another.44
43

Short Commentary (1950), p. 81.7; (1985), p. 117.12-13; (1987), p. 204: ...:.,..;15' _,J

..rAJI c)>- Jo.AJ~ i::.f."_,...

Themistius, Arabic (1973), pp. 188.17-189.4: ~ Ws- v.,s:.; ui if~ vi~ ~J
yo ..b-IJ Jj t::") ..b-l_,ll .!.lJ.) Ji if o::.f."J W) 1:. ..b-IJ JS'J Jo.Al~ <,S..il\J i_,AJ~ <.>..ill if ~..,.JI
::._,~ ~~ vh viS' .:~-i ifJ is-_r.... 4i.Jl..:-ll r_,l..ll ~ vfo •...:.,..;~)if .!.lJ.)
.;~ J~l JA:-11
J-; ~.l US'..,; .!l_r..; ..l>-1_, ~ LJ ~ r.1 _,J vh vi~-.;~~~ ')UL..:.o J_,')l ~I..,;Ul.l_, j_,')l
~ .y ~ ~ ~i. This corresponds to Themistius, Greek (1899), pp. 103.36-104.3 :
Ei Ot de; fva 1tOt11'ttKOV vouv li7taVtEc; l:ivay6J.1&9a ot croyKEtJ.lEVOt tK too oovaJ.lEt
Kai tv~:pyEi~. Kai tKacrtq> ftJ.lci>V to dvat 1tapa too tvoc; tKEivoo tcrtiv, oo XPTt
44

')-'!

eaoJ.lat;EtV. 1t09Ev yap at KOtvai svvotat; 1t09Ev ot

it
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Averroes was aided in forming this understanding of Themistius by
remarks shortly prior to these ~ which he finds the following in the Arabic
text: "So whence does the intellect which is in potency come to know all
things if that which guides it to act is not first understanding all things? " 45
At his second mention of Themistius in this section, A verroes also
understands Themistius to hold that the receptive material intellect is
a power which is eternal (azall) in its essence even though the intelligibles existing in it are corruptible due to their connection with the
forms of the imagination.46 That is, Themistius holds that the receptive
or potential intellect qua intellect must be entirely unaffected and separate as unmixed with the body so that it may be receptive of intelligibles.
In the Arabic version, we find Themistius referring to this receptive
intellect saying that, "the intellect does not use a bodily organ in its
activity and is entirely unmixed with the body such that it is unaffected
and separate " 47 and that as such it is imperishable. 48 Yet, while A verroes
holds that the material intellect also must be unaffected and separate, his
view is not the same as what he finds in Themistius. Averroes here reads
Themistius as holding that human beings have individual material intellects which are receptive of intelligibles so as to be unmixed with and
npciltCOV oprov O'UVE<nc; KUt 'tOW 7tp0l't(l)V 'al;troJ..Ul'trov ~TJ1tO't E yap OUOE 'tO cr9vttvat
dA..A.i]A.rov unt;p;(EV av, El ~TJ nc; ~V Eic; vouc;, 00 7ttl.V't£c; tKOtV(l)VOU!lEV. Themistius,
English (1996), p. 129: " There is no need to be puzzeled if we who are combined from
the potential and the actual [intellects] are referred back to one productive intellect, and
that what it is to be each of us is derived from that single [intellect]. Where otherwise do
the notions that are shared (koinoi ennoiai) come from? Where is the untaught and identical understanding of the primary definitions and primary axioms derived from? For we
would not understand one another unless there were a single intellect that we all shared."
45
•
11J.emistius, .Arabic (1973), p. 188.12-13:
.,!,..!.\'1 J.&..: iiy<)~ t,>.lll JA..ll ~ Ji .:/)
4JS' .,I,..!.)II jk.: :JJ\ _r .}All J! o.>~ t>.lll ~ ~ w). This corresponds to Themistius, Greek
(1899) p . 103.30-32: n69£V Ot Kai 6 OUVti!lEt vouc; 1ttiV'ta VOTJO'Et, El ~TJ npol'toc;
naV'ta voEi 6 npoayrov au'tov de; tvtpy~>tav; "From what source will the potential
intellect also come to think all objects, if the intellect that advances it to activity does not
think all objects prior to it?" Thernistius, English (1996), p . 128.
46
Short Commentary (1950), p . 83; (1985), p. 121 ; (1987) pp. 206-7.
47
Themistius, Arabic (1973), p. l9l.7-8: '}) .J...; ~ 4~ Ji ~ ~ ~~ JWI L.U
~}L.J ~ .r-" .J~ ')L...i ~\ .hl~. Thernistius, Greek (1899) p. 105.10-12: 'tOV vouv oi;
a'tE !lTJ ;(pm!1£VOV Opyaro O'(l)!lU'ttKql 7tpoc; 'tTJV tvtpy£tUV KUl "!itK'tOV 'tq> O'c0!1U'tt
7tUV'tCt7tUO't Kai dnaet; Kai xroptcr't6v.Thernistius, English (1996) p. 130: " [T]he intellect, insofar as it does not use a bodily organ for its activity, is entirely unmixed with the
body, is unaffected, and is separate."
48
At Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 104, 23 ff., the issue is the imperishability of the
potential intellect and the implied conclusion is for its intperishability. While part of the
Arabic text is missing from the sole extant manuscript, the conclusion of this section is
preserved. See nt. 47 for the texts.

4k

THEMISTIUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VERROES' NOETICS

17

separate from body and its affections and also to be imperishable as
recipients of intelligibles.49 In contrast, Averroes himself holds for the
unmixed and separate nature of the power called material intellect but
declines to hold for its imperishable and immortal nature, opting instead
for a very different understanding of the material intellect as a disposition of the fonns of the imagination in the soul and consequently as
perishable with its subject, as discussed above. 50
The third mention of Themistius in the chapter on the rational power
in the Short Commentary concerns A verroes' simply marveling that
Themistius can hold both (i) that the potential or material intellect does
not have a properly "material affectivity" (al-inficiil al-hayuliinl) and
nevertheless has many of the characteristics of matter and (ii) that the
intelligibles in it are eternal. As A verroes sees it in this work, Themistius
is involving too many of the conditions of matter, in the true or literal
sense of that term, in his understanding of the potential intellect, which
properly should be understood as material only metaphorically.51 Rather,
as indicated earlier, Averroes holds that the potential or material intellect
should not be understood as something existing imperishably separate
and somehow containing eternal intelligibles, but rather as a disposition
of the forms of the imagination.
Thus, in his Short Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Averroes
stresses the foundation of human knowledge in sense perception and the
processing, refming, and elevating of intentions by the inner powers of
the soul. In this the important role of spiritualizing belonged to the power
of imagination which he identified as distinctive in human beings for
serving the higher power of rationality. The nature of the intelligibles
grasped in human knowing of universals required that there be both a
receptive subject for immaterial intelligibles and also an active intellectual power to raise up to the level of intellect the potential intelligibles
in the intentions apprehended by sensation and the soul's internal powers.
That power was identified here with the Agent Intellect of De Anima 3.5,
while the receptive subject or material intellect was identified as a disposition of the human imagination. As such, however, insofar as the
human power of imagination is perishable, so too would be the human
49

See Long Commentary (1953), p. 389; pp. 392 ff. for the same view.
This view is close to that of Ibn Ba.ijah who held the material intellect to be "a form
having as its matter the intermediate spiritual forms of the imagination." See nt. 13 for
the Arabic text of Ibn Bli.ijah and references.
51
Short Commentary (1950), p. 84; (1985), pp. 121-122; (1987), p. 207.
50
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material intellect, though A verroes does not make explicit this obvious
consequence. As for Themisti1,1s, his teachings are not taken over by
A verroes but rather criticized as Platonic and rejected in view of the
contradictory elements Averroes found in those teachings.
1.2. The Middle Commentary on the De Anima
As indicated earlier, in the Middle Commentary on the De Anima
A verroes continues to hold for a plurality of individual human material
intellects. As I have indicated elsewhere,52 careful study of the paraphrasing Middle Commentary indicates a significant change of doctrine on the
nature of the material intellect in the thought of Averroes. Here Averroes
reacts against his own conception in the Short Commentary that the term
material intellect denotes not an intellect as such but rather a disposition
in the forms of the imagination having as subject the individual human
soul. Instead, A verroes raises the issue of the material intellect as necessarily unmixed with the body or a power in the body even though Aristotle himself does not broach this subject in his corresponding text. After
asserting that the material intellect must be altogether free of mixture
with material forms and "cannot be mixed with the subject in which it is
found" he goes on to explain that such a mixture would impede reception
or change the received form such that "the forms of things would not
exist in the intellect as they really are - that is, the forms existing in the
intellect would be changed into forms different from the actual forms. If,
therefore, the nature of the intellect is to receive the forms of things
which have retained their natures, it is necessary that it be a faculty
unmixed with any form whatsoever. " 53
While he had earlier thought that the material intellect must be understood metaphorically since properly speaking it is neither matter in the
primary sense nor intellect in the primary sense, here Averroes provides
an account which appears to address the issue of whether the material
intellect as receptive of intelligibles in act must not in fact have an existence wholly immaterial and separate from body and powers of body
such as imagination - and not only metaphorically so.

52
See the brief account in my article " Intelligibles in act in Averroes" cited in nt. 20.
lbis is discussed at greater length in Long Commentary tr. (2009), introduction, pp. XXVlllXLII.
53 Middle Commentary (2002), p. 109.
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In his account of De Anima 3.5 in the Middle Commentary, Averroes
rejects the extremes of the accounts of Alexander and Themistius. Alexander had conceived of the material intellect "as nothing other than
disposition only" and not an intellect as such. Averroes writes regarding
the view of Alexander, "Although this disposition is in a subject, since
it is not mixed with the subject, the subject does not serve as an intellect
in potentiality." 54 That is, while the name "material intellect" denotes
a disposition which is "in" or possessed by a human being, the subject
having the disposition is not itself the material intellect. Averroes rejects
this approach because this notion of disposition is characteristic of matter
and material things as receptive, while the subject for this disposition,
the human knower, must meet the criterion that "that which is disposed
to receive something intelligible must be an intellect. " 55 In contrast to
this denial of a substantial subject in which the material intellect exists,
Thernistius, here indicated by the words, "the other commentators," held
that the material intellect should be a disposition in a subject as a separate
substance since the material intellect must be unmixed. 56 Yet this position, says Averroes, requires the absurdity "that there should be a separate
substance, the existence of which occurs in disposition and potentiality." 57
That is, it requires that what is separate intellect and as such immaterial
and fully actual also have potentiality characteristic of material things.
These were the considerations that compelled Averroes to adopt his own
alternative view that rejects each of these approaches.
As Alfred lvry points out in the introduction to his translation of the
Middle Commentary,
The material intellect, consequently, stands in relation to the Agent Intellect
as matter stands in relation to form: it supplies the basis upon which the
Agent Intellect builds. For Averroes, though, the Agent Intellect does not
emanate its forms directly upon the material intellect of an individual. Rather,
like light upon an object, it "illuminates" or brings out the intelligible dimension of sensible forms, a dimension which is also latent or potential in the
forms occurring in both the sensory and imaginative faculties. The Agent
Intellect is said to actualize these potential intelligibles external to the intellect, as well as to actualize the material intellect itself - that is, to bring it
from potential to actual intellection.58
54

Middle Commentary (2002), p. 110.
Middle Commentary (2002), p. 110.5-6:
•_,A.!~ ~ ~ t..r"_,....11 ~ ~ ~ \.,kl~>v ..,...,.! .;i j.t .y .;i 'Jj t..r"_,.. ~_yo .)\.M,:...'JI l..i.A .:.>\5' .:>lJ
56
Middle Commentary (2002), p. 110.12-16.
57
Middle Commentary (2002), p. 111.1-2: o_,AJIJ ,)I.M,:...'JI..} o.)J"':"J cJ.J\A... ./')"':" uh ui
58
Middle Commentary (2002), introduction, p. XVII.
55
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The material intellect comes to actuality as intellect only thanks to its
conjoining with the Agent Intellect which is intellect per se and able to
raise this disposition in human beings to the level of receptive intellect.
This avoids the absurdity noted above, that of positing an immaterial
separate substance and intellect (which qua intellect is fully actual) as
having disposition and potentiality. Yet it allows for the receptivity of
disposition and potentiality characteristic of human understanding to be
conjoined with what is intellect per se as required by the intellectual
apprehension of intelligibles in act. Averroes describes this when he
writes,
Both approaches to the material intellect have thus been explained to you
- that of Alexander and that of the others - and it will have become clear
to you that the truth, which is the approach of Aristotle, is a combination
of both views, in the manner we have mentioned. For, by our position
as stated, we are saved from positing something separate in its substance
as a certain disposition, positing [instead] that the disposition found in it is
not due to its [own] nature but due to its conjunction with a substance
which has this disposition essentially - namely, man - while, in positing
that something here is associated incidentally with this disposition, we are
saved from [considering] the intellect in potentiality as a disposition only. 59

The model used by A verroes here is that of the celestial bodies,
souls and intellects, as noted by Marc Geoffroy. 6 For Averroes the
celestial soul moves the associated celestial body and is equivocally
"in" it without being composed with it after the manner of the substantial
or accidental composition that takes place among hylomorphic entities.
That is, just as the celestial soul is the mover "in" and belonging to the
moving celestial body without being literally in it as composed with it,
so too the human material intellect is "in" and belongs to the knowing
human being without being composed in a hylomorphic way as with a
material subject. In this way A verroes meets the need that the subject for
intelligibles in act, the material intellect, must literally be immaterial and
separate as an intellect - even if it is a disposition. Although this sort of
separation from the body and the powers of soul existing in body assures
a properly immaterial subject for intelligibles in act, Averroes does not

°

59
Middle Commentary (2002), p. 112.6-13. That is, this association with the transcendent Agent Intellect is incidental to the essence of the Agent Intellect but essential to
the nature of human beings as rational animals able to have intellectual understanding of
the intelligibles garnered from sense perception and the activities of the internal senses.
Note that I change Ivry's " substantively separate" for o/'y.- ,_; \i}A.• to "separate in its
·
substance."
60 A verroes. La Beatitude de /'tim e (2001), pp. 64-65, 71 ff.
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separate intellect from soul and body wholly, since the material intellect
continues to be "in" and to belong to the human being from whom it
derives its individuation as the material intellect of this particular person.
What brings the human material intellect from potentiality to actuality
is the activity of the Agent Intellect in its dual function as agent in the
abstraction of intellibles and as "form for us" insofar as it is present in
us and acting in accord with our will in our efforts to abstract intelligibles
from human experience of the world. Averroes writes,
It is clear that, in one respect, this intellect is an agent and, in another, it is
a form for us ($ilrah la-nd}, since the generation of intelligibles is a product
of our will. When we want to think something, we do so, our thinking it
being nothing other than, first, bringing the intelligible forth and, second,
receiving it. The individual intentions in the imaginative faculty are they
that stand in relation to the intellect as potential colors do to light. That is,
this intellect renders them actual intelligibles after their having been intelligible in potentiality. It is clear, from the nature of this intellect- which,
in one respect, is a form for us (~urah la-na) and, in another, is the agent for
the intelligibles- that it is separable and neither generable nor corruptible,
for that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon, and the
principle is superior to the matter. The intelligent and intelligible aspects of
this intellect are essentially the same thing, since it does not think anything
external to its essence. There must be an Agent Intellect here, since that
which actualizes the intellect has to be an intellect, the agent endowing only
that which resembles what is in its substance.61

Earlier in his Short Commentary Averroes used the phraseology of
"form for us" to describe the way the Agent Intellect generates intelligibles in the material intellect. 62 Here that notion is present as well as the
consideration that these intelligibles come to exist by our willing. In its
activity of bringing about intelligibles in act subsequent to our initiation
of the effort to think by providing intentions in the imagination, the Agent
Intellect is available to us a power for abstracting intelligibles which may
be suitably denominated as "a product of our will." This development of
the notion of the Agent Intellect as an agent power for abstraction at our
disposal and available by our willing seems clearly to be derived from the
account of Themistius in his Paraphrase of the De Anima. In the Arabic
text of the account of Themistius we fmd him writing that
The relation of craft to matter is just as the relation of the actual intellect
(al_caql al-facil) to the intellect in potency. In this manner the intellect
61
62

Middle Commentary (2002), p. 116. Translation slightly modified.
See nt. 38.
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comes to be every thing and the intellect makes every thing. In that way it
comes about for us that we understand when we wish insofar as the Agent
Intellect (al-.::aql al-fcPiil) is not' external to the intellect in potency as the
art is external to the matter. 63

While careful examination of the Middle Commentary together with the
Paraphrase of the De Anima by Themistius does indicate that Averroes
made more use of this work than is easily evident to a casual reader, 64
the thought of Themistius as studied a second time by A verroes seems
most importantly to have served to strengthen the sense of the phase
"form for us" (~urah la-na). The Agent Intellect is now to be located not
just as agent in the soul but to be so intimately present to the soul in the
generation of intelligibles in the material intellect and in the very being
of the material intellect as immaterial as nearly to be a power belonging
to the soul.

The~stius, Arabic (1974), p. 179.9-12:
J.WIJ ~~ JS' ~ ji>JI ~_,lii~J o_,AJ~ }.i.JI ~ ~Lill ~I v-l:i y. J_,..JI ~ ~L.all v-\,.0
o)AJ~ ji>JI if ~.Jl>- y. c.r:ol JL:.A!I JA.JI .:>4 \.:.:..!. t? j.W .:>I W!JL,p .!,ll.) j.; ifJ ~~ jS' ~
• .J~I if ~.Jl>- ~L.all ;)j L.S
Note that here Lyons reads ~~ JS' ~ JA-JIJ ~~ jS' ~ J.WI ~_,ll I~)· However,
I understand ~ (understands) fo be a mistake for"~ (makes) and translate according
to this revision of the printed text. This is a common mistake in Arabic manuscripts.
Precisely what Averroes had in his manuscript or just what he understood to be the correct reading is not certain. While for Themistius the actual intellect comes to exist when
the Productive (Agent) Intellect acts on the intellect in potency, in the Middle Commentary Averroes understood actual intellect (al_caql al{ii"il) and Agent Intellect (al-caql aljifciil) in this passage both to refer to the Agent Intellect. See Middle Commentary (2002)
117.8-10:, C:>.ill JA.JI if~/' l,; C:>.ill j.WI .;i 0J;. ~_rA...JI -..J~J v-.,Ja..-.IS .;i ~ .;i ~J
jt...A.ll <..i""l JMJ~ C$.ill j.WI ifJ o_,AJ~ . The translation of this is in the paragraph which
follows in the body of this article.
Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 99.11-14: ov1tsp o?>v f) -csxvTJ Ttpoc; 'tTJV 6A.TJV A.Oyov
exst, -coihov Kat 6 voile; 6 7t01TJ't1Koc; 1tpoc; -cov ouvaJ.!st, Kat o6-croc; 6 J.!EV Ttav-ca yivs-cat, 6 o€ Ttav-ca Ttotd. oto Kai £<p'TjJ.1'iv vosiv ~ouA.ci)Jlsea ou yap e~roesv -cfic; uA.TJc;
ii 'tSXVTJ ... Themistius, English (1996), p. 123 : "So the status that a craft has in relation
to its matter is the same as that the productive intellect also has to the potential [intellect],
and in this way the latter becomes all things, while the former produces all things. That is
why it is also in our power to think whenever we wish; for <the productive intellect> is
not outside <the potential intellect as> the craft <is ourside> the matter. ... " Later in the
same passage Themistius writes of the actual intellect being added to and united with the
potential intellect. Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 99.17-18: ou-cro yap Kat 6 Ka-c' tv&pystav voile; -c(p ouvaJ.!Sl vel> 7tpoo-ysv6J.1svoc; de; -cs yivs-cat J.!S't' au'tou. Themistius,
English (1996), p. 123: "For this is how the actual intellect too is added to the potential
intellect and becomes one with it." Themistius, Arabic (1974), p. 179.16-17: ji>JI .!.11~
l..l>-IJ ""'-" .JL,.. o_,AJ~ ji>JI Jl ~ll.)j JMJ~ . "so in this way the intellect in act then joins with
the intellect in potency becoming one with it."
64
This is discussed in Long Commentary tr. (2009), introduction, pp. XXIX-XXX.
63
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Direct mention of Themistius occurs in the Middle Commentary only
once, in the following passage:
You ought to know that Themistius and most commentators regard the intellect in us as composed of the intellect which is in potency and the intellect
which is in act, that is, the Agent Intellect. In a certain way it is composite
and does not think its essence but thinks what is here, when the imaginative
intentions are joined to it. The intelligibles perish due to the passing away
of these intentions, forgetting and error thus occurring to [our intellect].
They interpret Aristotle's statement in this manner, as explained in our
commentary on his discourse.65

In sum, in both the Short Commentary and the Middle Commentary
A verroes held the view that each human being has a personal material
intellect through which intelligibles in act and intellectual understanding
take place for individuals. In the Short Commentary the material intellect
is taken as a name denoting the receptive power for retaining intelligibles
as a disposition of the forms of the imagination in the human soul. In
the Middle Commentary, Averroes understood the material intellect to
be immaterial and separate from body, soul, and imagination so as to be
a true intellectual and immaterial subject for intelligibles in act, though
nevertheless retaining a certain presence "in" or a necessary association with the human being to whom it belongs and in virtue of whom
the material intellect has its individuation. The human material intellect
could only have its nature as intellect through a conjoining or uniting
with the Agent Intellect since the material intellect in its own right could
neither be solely disposition nor wholly intellect. In both works Averroes
engages the work of Themistius. He criticizes Themistius in the Short
Commentary for a seemingly incoherent teaching on intellect and intelligibles, a doctrine too literal in its understanding of the material intellect
as intellect and as matter. In the Middle Commentary Averroes makes
only a passing mention of the name of Themistius. However, Averroes
does draw on the latter' s notion of the Agent Intellect as available for
human use when we wish to enhance his conception of the intrinsic
presence of the Agent Intellect as being both form and agent for human
understanding. As we shall see, however, reflections on teachings in the
Paraphrase of the De Anima by Themistius played a major role in the
formation of the new doctrine of the single, eternal Material Intellect
shared by all human beings set forth in full in the Long Commentary on
the De Anima.
65

Middle Commentary (2002), p. I 17.11 - 18.
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2. Intellect in Averroes' Long Commentary on De Anima of Aristotle:
One Transcendent Shared A~ent Intellect and One Transcendent
Shared Material Intellect
In all three of his Commentaries on the De Anima A verroes sided with
the Greek-and Arabic traditions in asserting the existence of a single
transcendent and immaterial Agent Intellect shared by all human beings
functioning, according to him, as an abstracting cause of the intelligibles
understood in human knowing. Unique to Averroes is his famous late
teaching in the Long Commentary on De Anima that there is a single
Material Intellect receptive of intelligibles in act and shared by all human
beings. This notion was first raised as a possibility by A verroes in a short
treatise on human conjunction with separate intellect which has come to
be labeled Epistle 1 on Conjunction. There Averroes raises the question
of whether a receptive and immaterial disposition such as the material
intellect might exist "as a substance one in number for all human beings
in itself. " 66 As was made clear in the Middle Commentary, in order to be
intellect and to be a subject receptive of intelligibles, this disposition
named material intellect must be separate from body and truly immaterial
as intellect. In the Middle Commentary that separation met the necessary
requirements by being only equivocally "in" the human soul following
the model of the intellects, souls and bodies in the heavens. That is, the
material intellect is not in the soul as composed with it but as associated
with the individual human soul and as identified as belonging to and as
being individuated by the individual who provides the imagined forms
for abstraction. The proposal now under consideration in Epistle 1 on
Conjunction and which became his mature view in the Long Commentary,
the Material Intellect as receptive disposition existing as " a substance
one in number for all human beings" was unequivocally rejected by
Averroes in the Middle Commentary where he called absurd the notion
"that there should be a separate substance, the existence of which occurs
in disposition and potentiality. This [is absurd] because potentiality is one
of the properties of material objects. " 67
The possibility of a single shared Material Intellect considered in
Epistle 1 on Conjunction involves not just separation from the particular
66

A verroes. La Beatitude de l'ame (2001}, p. 210. Note that here Averroes considers
the possibility that the material intellect be not just a disposition but a substance in its
own right. He had explicitly rejected that view in the Middle Commentary. See Middle
Commentary (2002}, p. 111.
67
Middle Commentary (2002), p. 111.
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body and soul for the sake of a particular human being's immaterial
reception of intelligibles, but also a separation from individuation by a
particular body and sou1.68 The model employed here is again a celestial
one. Averroes raises the issue of whether there might not be another kind
of separation which does not entail the individuation of what is separate
by a body to which it is in some fashion related. Such is the case with
the First Mover of Physics VID, 69 which is essential to the existence of
the motions of the heavens and all things on earth and yet is not dependent for its being and individuation on the plurality of things in which it
causes motion. From the side of moved things of the universe, the First
Mover, the Unmoved Mover, is an essential cause of the existence of
movement. But from the side of the First Mover, none of the caused
movements or moved things is essential and definitive of its being;
rather, they are incidental to the being of the First Mover which is one
in number per se, not per aliud. It is in this context that A verroes asks,
"So what would be able to prevent one from thinking that some dispositions can exist in this way? " 70 A verroes does not explore the matter
further in Epistle 1 on Conjunction but chooses to leave the question for
another opportunity when it can be given profound study. Averroes found
that opportunity in the course of his completion of his Long Commentary
on the De Anima.
The preparation of the fmal version of the Long Commentary provided
Averroes with a third opportunity to study in depth the Paraphrase of the
De Anima by Thernistius along with the text of the De Anima itself in
two translations. 71 In the course of his studies in preparation of what is
generally regarded as the fmal version of the Long Commentary extant
68

I discuss this issue at greater length in "Intelligibles in act in Averroes" cited in
note 20.
69 Averroes. La Beatitude de /'arne (2001), p. 210. Geoffroy identifies the reference as
Physics Vill, 266a10-b6. On celestial movement and the relation of celestial bodies, souls
and intellects, see Twetten, D., "Averroes' prime mover argument," in Averroes et les
averroi'smes juif et latin. Actes du colloque tenu a Paris, I6-I8 juin 2005 (cited in note
15), pp. 9-75, and the literature cited there.
70
Averroes. La B eatitude de l'ame (2001), p. 210.
71
The main translation used and provided in full by Averroes is not extant in Arabic
aside from some fragments and quotations in other thinkers. It is represented in the Latin
text and also in Hebrew translation. For the Hebrew, see Aristotle's 'De Anima'. Translated into Hebrew by Zerahyah Ben Isaac Ben Shea/tiel Hen. A Critical Edition with an
Introduction and Index, Bos, G., ed., Leiden-New York-Koln, 1994. The alternate translation cited by Averroes in the Long Commentary is available in Aristotelis De Anima
(Aris{ufalisfi an-Nafs), Badawi, <A. ed. (Cairo: lmprimerie Misr S.A.E., 1954; Rpt. Beirut/
Kuwait, 1980). For a discussion of the current state of scholarship on the Arabic translations of Aristotle's De Anima, see the appendix on this issue by Puig Montada, J., to
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only in Latin, A verroes rediscovered in Themistius the principle key
to his assertion of the unity of the Material Intellect. As we have seen,
Themistius asserted the necessity of the unity of intelligibles for the sake
of shared sciences and understanding: "For it is right that, if we do not
have one intellect in which we all share, then we also do not have understanding of one another. " 72 This is the first of the two principles found
in Thernistius which Averroes adopts in the Long Commentary arguing
against the notion of a plurality of the very same intelligibles in act existing in distinct human intellects. That is, since a proper understanding of
knowledge requires that there be only one intelligible in act, say of horse,
for the sake of common human understanding and intersubjective discourse, that very same intelligible cannot be multiplied in distinct human
minds. Rather, science requires that there be a single collection of intelligibles in act for the universality of knowledge. 73 This doctrine, surely
"Ibn Baija" published in the The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See nt. 8 for the
complete reference.
72 See nt. 44 for the text.
73 "That way in which we posited the being of the material intellect solves all the
questions resulting from our holding that the intellect is one and many. For, if the thing
understood in me and in you were one in every way, it would happen that when I would
know some intelligible you would also know it, and many other impossible things [would
also follow]. If we assert it to be many, then it would happen that the thing understood in
me and in you would be one in species and two in individual [number]. In this way the
thing understood will have a thing understood and so it proceeds into infinity. Thus, it
will be impossible for a student to learn from a teacher unless the knowledge which is
in the teacher is a power generating and creating the knowledge which is in the student,
in the way in which one frre generates another {412} fire similar to it in species, which
is impossible. That what is lmown is the same in the teacher and the student in this way
caused Plato to believe that learning is recollection. Since, then, we asserted that the intelligible thing which is in me and in you is many in subject insofar as it is true, namely,
the forms of the imagination, and one in the subject in virtue of which it is an existing
intellect (namely, the material [intellect]), those questions are completely resolved." Long
Commentary (1953), pp. 411-412; tr. (2009), pp. 328-329. Averroes is here drawing on
Themistius, Greek (1899), pp. 104 ff. Averroes is well aware that this in turn requires
that the material intellect itself be immaterial and unique with an existence of its own as
an entity distinct in being and species. "[T]he definition of the material intellect, therefore, is that which is in potency all the intentions of universal material forms and is not
any of the beings in act before it understands any of them. Since that is the definition
of the material intellect, it is evident that according to him it differs from prime matter
in this respect: it is in potency all the intentions {388} of the universal material forms,
while prime matter is in potency all those sensibles forms [and is] not something which
knows or apprehends [things]. The reason why that nature is something which discerns
and knows while prime matter neither lmows nor discerns, is because prime matter receives
diverse forms, namely, individual and particular forms , while this [nature] receives universal forms. From this it is apparent that this nature is not a determinate particular (non
est aliquid hoc) nor a body nor a power in a body. For, if it were so, then it would receive
forms inasmuch as they are diverse and particular; and if it were so, then the forms existing
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derived from Thernistius, allows Averroes to move beyond the teachings of the Middle Commentary and to assert just what was called for
in Epistle 1 on Conjunction. What had prevented the assertion of the
existence of the Material Intellect "as a substance one in number for all
human beings in itself" was precisely the doctrine of the Middle and
Short Commentaries that the material intellect is a disposition in or
associated and individuated in being by the particular human soul to
which it belongs. In those two earlier works Averroes did not raise
the issue of the nature of the intelligibles in detail to characterize the
ontological and epistemological concerns at stake. Here in the Long
Commentary he takes that up in detail and crafts his doctrine on the
basis of this conception of the nature of intelligibles in act and openly
recognizes the very special character of the Material Intellect when he
writes, "One should hold that it is a fourth kind of being. " 74 The resultant doctrine is that of the twofold subject: the intelligibles are to be
understood as many insofar as they are caused by and linked to particular human beings and their individual human imaginative powers
which are responsible for their truth (the subject of truth) and are to be
understood as one insofar as they have the unique Material Intellect as
the immaterial subject into which the intelligibles in act are received
(the subject of existence). 75
The second key principle Averroes found in Thernistius is that of
the formal, intrinsic participation by all human knowers in a single transcendent entity, the Agent Intellect. This we have already seen expressed
in the Short Commentary and in the Middle Commentary with the phraseology describing the Agent Intellect as "form for us." In the Long
Commentary Averroes continues to stress this notion but intensifies its
meaning by repeating that the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect
in it would be intelligibles in potency; and thus it would not discern the nature of the
forms inasmuch as they are forms, as is the disposition in the case of individual forms,
be they spiritual or corporeal. For this reason, if that nature which is called intellect
receives forms, it must receive forms by a mode of reception other than that by which
those matters receive the forms whose contraction by matter is the determination of
prime matter in them. For this reason it is not necessary that it be of the genus of those
matters in which the form is included, nor that it be prime matter itself. Since, if this
were so, then the reception in these would be of the same genus; for the diversity of the
received nature causes the diversity of the nature of the recipient. This, therefore, moved
Aristotle to set forth this nature which is other than the nature of matter, other than the
nature of form, and other than the nature of the composite." Long Commentary (1953),
pp. 387-388; tr. (2009), pp. 304-305. Note t.~e attribution to Aristotle.
74
Long Commentary (1953), p. 409; tr. (2009), p. 326.
15
See the ftrst text in nt. 73.
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are "in the soul." 76 Here, of course, A verroes is following Aristotle who,
at De Anima 3.5, 430a13-14, indicates that potential and actualizing
powers of mind must be in the soul (tv tft \jTUX.ft), as also Alexander
and Themistius state.77 Now, however, Averroes intensifies the notion of
the Agent Intellect being a form which acts in us and by our volition by
stressing that it is "form for us" as intrinsic and essential to human nature
while also having an existence of its own external to the human soul.
He writes,
For because that in virtue of which something carries out its proper activity
is the form, while we carry out {500} our proper activity in virtue of the
agent intellect, it is necessary that the agent intellect be form in us... [l]t is
necessary that a human being understand all the intelligibles through the
intellect proper to him and that he carry out the activity proper to him in
regard to all beings, just as he understands by his proper intellection all the
beings through the intellect in a positive disposition (intellectus in habitu),
when it has been conjoined with forms of the imagination.78

That is, accepting that the Agent Intellect is a separately existing entity
outside the human soul, that its power is required for intellectual abstraction and that abstractive thinking is in our will, A verroes embraces the
76
See, for example, Long Commentary (1953), pp. 390; 406; 437; and 438; tr. (2009),
pp. 307; 322; 349 et 350.
77
Averroes understood another alternative to be the view of al-Farabi that the Agent
Intellect is only a cause acting on the human soul, not as "form for us." Regarding alFarabi, see the literature cited in note 6.
78
Quoniam, quia illud per quod agit aliquid suam propriam actionem est forma, nos
autem agimus per intellectum {500} agentem nostram actionem propriam, necesse est
ut intellectus agens sit forma in nobis.
Et nullus modus est secundum quem generetur forma in nobis nisi iste. Quoniam, cum
intellecta speculativa copulantur nobiscum per formas ymaginabiles, et intellectus agens
copulatur cum intellectis speculativis (illud enim quod comprehendit ea est idem, scilicet
intellectus materia/is), necesse est ut intellectus agens copuletur nobiscum per continuationem intellectorum speculativorum.
Et manifestum est quod, cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in
potentia, quod ipse erit copulatus nobiscum in potentia. Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit ipse tunc copulatus nobis in actu. Et cum
quedam fuerint potentia et quedam actu, tunc erit ipse copulatus secundum partem et
secundum partem non; et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem.
Et manifestum est quod, cum iste motus complebitur, quod statim iste intellectus copulabitur nobiscum omnibus modis. Et tunc manifestum est quod proportio eius ad nos in
ilia dispositione est sicut proportio intellectus qui est in habitu ad nos. Et cum ita sit,
necesse est ut homo intelligat per intellectum sibi proprium omnia entia, et ut agat
actionem sibi propriam in omnibus entibus, sicut intelligit per intellectum qui est in
habitu, quando fuerit continuatus cum formis ymaginabilibus, omnia entia intel/ectione
propria.
Long Commentary (1953), pp. 499-500 (emphasis added); tr. (2009), p. 399.
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notion that the Agent Intellect must also be our intrinsic formal cause
insofar as we are knowers. That is, the soul's abstractive nature, theAgent
Intellect, must be included in the very definition of the nature of human
beings as rational animals. 79 Only by this intrinsic sharing or participation
of the Agent Intellect are human beings able to carry out the operations
and activities in virtue of which humans are called rational. Such a view,
all the same, is hardly an obvious interpretation of the words of Aristotle
in De Anima 3.5. In the Long Commentary Averroes criticized al-Farabi
for holding that the Agent Intellect is only an extrinsic agent cause and
not "form for us.'' 80 However, the view that Averroes expounds in the
Long Commentary can be found in the Paraphrase of the De Anima by
Themistius.
Working through the complex issues and requirements of the Aristotelian account of intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, Themistius asserted the
existence of four sorts of intellects: the potential intellect, the actual
intellect, the Productive Intellect (Agent Intellect in the Arabic available
to Averroes), and the passible intellect. The last of these four may be
dismissed for present purposes since it is identified with the imagination
and is characterized as perishable. On the account of Themistius, the
potential intellect garners images from the imagination and comes to be
79 Thomas Aquinas repeatedly uses the very same principle to the very different end
of establishing that the agent intellect must be a power intrinsic to each human soul and
cannot exist as a transcendent substance outside the soul. For example, he writes in his De
spiritualibus creaturis, Omne autem agens quamcumque actionem, habet forma/iter in
seipso virtutem quae est talis actionis principium. Untie sicut necessarium est quod intellectus possibilis sit aliquid forma/iter inhaerens homini, ut prius ostendimus; ita necessarium est quod intellectus agens sit aliquid formaliter inhaerens homini. De spiritualibus creaturis, Cos, J ., ed., Rome and Paris, 2000, [S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia
lussu Leonis XIII P.M . edita Cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, Tomus XXIV, 2],
a. 2 resp., p. 24.170-183. "Every thing performing some action has formally in itself the
power which is the principle of such an action. Hence, just as it is necessary that the possible intellect be something formally inhering in a human being, as we showed earlier, so
too it is necessary that the agent intellect be something formally inhering in a human
being." Aquinas also invokes what I call the Principle of Intrinsic Formal Cause in this
work at a. 2, resp, p. 25.227-230, and at a. lO resp., p. 106.268-274. For a detailed discussion of this, see Taylor, R. C., "Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause in the Soul according
to Aquinas and Averroes" in The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul: Reflections on Platonic
Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, Dillon, J., and El-Kaisy Friemuth, M., eds. Leiden,
2009, pp.l87-220.
80 On this see the articles mentioned in nt. 6. This view of al-Farabi, while accurate
insofar as the Agent Intellect is not held to be an intrinsic "form for us" according to
al-Farabi, does not convey the nuanced view of al-Farabi in a clear way. Al-Farabi seems
to hold that abstraction is in some sense done by the individual human being thanks to
the activity of the Agent Intellect or thanks to a power bestowed on the individual by the
Agent Intellect.
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taken over and penetrated to its depths by the Productive Intellect, which
functions as an indispensible aid to ttJe actual intellect responsible for
the abstraction of intelligibles. Themistius says regarding the Productive
Intellect, "[W]hen the productive intellect encounters [the potential
intellect] and takes over this 'matter' of thoughts, the potential intellect
becomes one with it, and becomes able to make transitions, and to combine and divide thoughts, and to observe thoughts from [the perspective
of] one another. " 81 He then writes that " ... the productive intellect
settles into the whole of the potential intellect, as though the carpenter
and the smith did not control their wood and bronze externally but
were able to pervade it totally. For this is how the actual intellect too
is added to the potential intellect and becomes one with it. " 82 Thus,
human intellectual understanding comes about only when the transcendent and separately existing Productive Intellect penetrates and pervades
the potential intellect thereby providing to and in the individual human
being the intellectual power for abstraction called actual intellect. Without the intrinsic presence of the Productive Intellect which is the primary
source of abstractive illumination in and employed by the individual
human being's actual intellect, intellectual understanding would not take
place.83 Further, for Themistius the Productive Intellect is declared to be
the real self of a human being insofar it provides the power of intellectual actuality which is responsible for human nature to exist as rational
and intellectual in act. He writes, "What it is to be me therefore comes

81

Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 99.8-10; English (1996), p. 123; Arabic (1973),
p. 179.14-17.
82
Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 99.15-18; English (1996), p. 123; Arabic (1973),
p. 179.14-17.
83
" [T]he intellect that illuminates (ellampon) in a primary sense is one, while those
that are illuminated (ellamponenoi) and that illuminate (el/ampontes) are, just like light,
more than one." Themistius, Greek (1899), p. 103.30-33; English (1996), pp. 128-129;
Arabic (1973), p. 188.12-14. He earlier writes, "Therefore 'it is necessary that these
differences exist in the soul too' (430a13-14) and while one intellect must be potential,
the other must be actual, i.e. perfect and not at all potential, or due to natural adaptation, but an intellect that is actual, which, by being combined with the potential intellect
and advancing it to actuality, brings to completion the intellect as hexis, in which the
universal objects of thought and bodies of knowledge exist." Themistius, Greek ( 1899),
p. 98.19-24, English (1996), p. 122, Arabic (1973), pp. 172-174. Also see Greek (1899),
p. 99.6-10, English (1996), p. 123, Arabic (1973), p. 179.6-9. In the account in the
Paraphrase of the De Anima the Productive Intellect, while, not the First Cause, is said
to think only separate forms "continuously and perpetually" and is characterized as a
" divine intellect, which is separate and exists in actuality, thinks none of the enmattered forms." Themistius, Greek (1899), pp. 114.34-115.9; English (1996), p. 141;
Arabic (1973), pp. 209.16-210.10.
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from the productive intellect alone, since this alone is form in a pre<;:ise
sense." He then asserts that "we are the Productive Intellect. " 84 Thus,
intellectual understanding is to be accounted for by a participation of the
transcendent Productive Intellect by the human knower, a participation
that involves the immediate and necessary formal presence of the Productive Intellect in very activity of human intellectual understanding.
While Averroes does not follow Thernistius in holding for an individual abstracting actual intellect to exist in each human soul, he did read
in the Arabic version of Themistius that "the existence belonging to me
[as rational animal] is from the Agent Intellect" and "we are the Agent
Intellect" 85 as well as the other passages cited in the previous paragraph.
Further, just as in Thernistius, there is in Averroes the argument that the
transcendent Productive or Agent Intellect must necessarily not stand off
at a distance and act only as an agent cause in the abstraction of forms
from the images in memory but rather it must penetrate and become
wholly present as intrinsic formal cause such that it is a power under the
willing control of the human being to which it belongs. In light of these
considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that Averroes' third reading of the Paraphrase of the De Anima by Themistius in conjunction with
a comprehensive study of the De Anima in the Long Commentary is likely
responsible for the intensification of the doctrine of the Agent Intellect
as "form for us" into the teaching that transcendent Agent Intellect must
be shared and formally present in the human soul.

3. Conclusion: Participation in Themistius and Averroes
I have argued here that two principles central to the mature noetics of
Averroes set forth in the frnal Long Commentary on the De Anima reflect
the influence of his study of the Paraphrase of the De Anima by Thernistius. The first, that there must be a single set of intelligibles shared by
all human beings for science and human intersubjective discourse to be
possible, was set out by Themistius in a way that indicates that these are
to be located in the Productive I Agent Intellect. For Themistius these
intelligibles are not emanated to human knowers but rather remain in the

84

Themistius, Greek (1899), pp. 100.20-101.1; English (1996), p. 125; Arabic (1973),
pp. 182.13- 183.5. My capitalization of "Productive Intellect" here an~ ~lsewhere.
85 Themistius, Arabic (1983), p. 182.16-17: J~l J.WI 0" .:;~ w) 1.>)
.)~_,l\t and
p. 183.5 : J~l JA.JI i.>) ~·
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Productive Intellect which is asserted to contain all the forms. The content of human knowledge for Thernistius, rather, comes from abstraction
from the images garnered by human beings through perception, imagination and memory. Averroes agreed with Themistius in this, holding that
human knowledge has its content from intentions first gathered in sense
perception, then passed on and made more spiritual and less material in
the common sense, then placed in imagination, then processed by cogitation, and fmally placed in memory as the content on which the abstractive
power of the Agent Intellect is brought to bear. He disagreed, however,
in the notion that the forms of things are in any way precontained in the
Agent Intellect. 86 Nevertheless, Averroes' adoption from Themistius of
the notion that knowledge necessarily requires a single set of common
referents or intelligibles in act played a crucial role in the formation of
his mature doctrine of the Material Intellect.
For each of these thinkers the notion of a common human sharing or
participating in a single set of intelligibles in act was a necessary part
of their theories of human intellectual understanding, be it done directly
as in the case of A verroes' conception of the shared Material Intellect
or perhaps indirectly in Themistius' assertion that the forms must be
precontained in the Agent Intellect which guides and aids the human soul
in intellectual abstraction. 87 Does this, then, provide grounds for fmding
a certain Platonism at work in the thought of A verroes? In this case
the answer appears to be, no. In contrast to a Platonism which fmds the
essences or intelligible realities of things in the world to have primary
existence in separate forms, Averroes holds that all the content of intellectual understanding is derived from sensory experience of things of the
world. For him the forms of things exist either in the things of the world
or in the soul. If in the soul, then there they exist as intelligibles in accord
with the ontological requirements of intelligibles in act. That is, they
must be immaterial realities as intelligibles and can only be present in
a unique subject which is an immaterial intellect and yet receptive of
abstracted intelligibles in act, the Material Intellect. This notion of the
intelligibles being in the soul, then, is fully in accord with Averroes'
86

Long Commentary (1953), p. 441 : "For the agent intelligence understands nothing
of the things which are here. It was necessary that the agent intelligence be separate,
unmixed and impassible, insofar as it is what makes all forms intelligible."
87
•
For Themistius this may have functioned as assuring that only true or proper intelligtbles are abstracted by human actual intellects and received in human potential intellects,
though he does not gjve a detailed account of why intelligibles must be in the Productive
Intellect.
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assertion that the Material Intellect must be, like the Agent Intellect, in
the soul. Further, as we have seen, they must constitute a single shared·
set of intelligibles for the sake of the very meaning of knowledge as a
shared, common human intellectual understanding evident in discourse.
Yet, this seems rather to be in accord with the nature of human science
as conceived by Aristotle, even if Aristotle himself never asserted the
existence of a separate receptive Material Intellect in his sorely underdetermined thinking on the nature of human intellectual understanding.
Perhaps, then, it would be best to call this an Aristotelian participation.
The same term, Aristotelian participation, seems to apply suitably to
the second principle so important to the noetics of Averroes and Themistius, the notion of the Agent I Productive Intellect as operating intrinsically in the human soul to the extent that it must be considered as intrinsic formal cause for its role in the activity of intellectual abstraction at
the heart of human intellectual understanding. A Platonic participation in
this case would instead involve a sharing of the actuality and power of
the transcendent Agent I Productive Intellect in a diminished way in a
lower level participant. But for each of these thinkers it is the very Agent I
Productive Intellect itself, not an image or a diminished participant,
which is at work in the human soul to make abstraction and undertanding
a very real part of the nature of human beings as rational and intellectual.
A verroes struggled with the doctrine of the intellect through all three
of his commentaries on the De Anima of Aristotle working to meet the
complex requirements of the Greek and Arabic traditions. In all three
commentaries his chief interlocutors from the Greek tradition were
Thernistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias. He seems to have come to
grips with the teaching of Alexander by the time of the Middle Commentary but the value and importance of the Paraphrase on the De Anima by
Thernistius clearly grew through the years as he worked through that text
and its challenges repeatedly. This is not to say that Averroes was merely
a follower of Themistius, something that clearly was not the case. However, his encounters and engagements with the arguments and accounts of
Thernistius played a significant role in his formulation of issues and
answers concerning the doctrine of intellect in Aristotle, a doctrine that
continues to challenge and stimulate philosophers today. 88

88 My thanks to Alfred lvry, Carlos Bazan, Peter Adamson, Owen Goldin, Carlos
Fraenkel, David Twetten, Myrna Gabbe and Nathan Blackerby for valuable challenges,
comments and suggestions regarding issues discussed here. This article is a product of the
Aquinas and the 'Arabs' Project. For information see www .AquinasAndTheArabs.org.
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